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Abstract: This article examines the role of ASEAN's norms in managing dispute over the South China Sea. 
ASEAN shares the beliefs that the settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful means and the abandonment 
of the threat or use of force are necessary to ensure the stability over the region. It attempts to analyze the 
possibility of exporting this intramural norm of ASEAN's model of dispute settlement into an extramural terrain 
and seeks to answer the question whether ASEAN's norm of cooperation can alter claimants' perception towards 
each other, and thus in return will constrain the urge to solve the dispute by force. 
Keywords : ASEAN norm, ASEAN's model of dispute settlements, TAC, South China Sea, China           
Abstrak: Artikel ini membahas peran norma ASEAN dalam mengelola sengketa Laut Cina Selatan. ASEAN 
berbagi keyakinan bahwa penyelesaian perbedaan atau perselisihan dengan cara damai dan ditinggalkannya 
ancaman atau penggunaan kekuatan yang diperlukan untuk menjamin stabilitas di kawasan ini. Ia mencoba untuk 
menganalisis kemungkinan mengekspor ini norma intramural model ASEAN penyelesaian sengketa menjadi 
medan luar sekolah dan berusaha untuk menjawab pertanyaan apakah norma kerja sama ASEAN dapat 
mengubah persepsi dan membatasi keinginan untuk memecahkan permasalahan dengan tidak menggunakan 
kekerasan
Kata kunci : norma ASEAN, model penyelesaian sengketa ASEAN, TAC, Laut Cina Selatan, Cina
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credibility as a regional bloc. 
Mitigation response was immediately 
taken by Indonesia Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Marty Natalegawa by touring bilaterally to each 
of ASEAN member states aimed to negotiate the 
needs to create an unanimous ASEAN 
declaration on the South China Sea. Yet such 
move failed to conceal doubtness on ASEAN 
effectiveness in managing conflict.
China's assertive stance to exert its 'ownership' 
over the South China Sea creates heavy 
atmosphere in Southeast Asia politic. The use of 
force seems possible by the neglected 
Philippines in order to hold their territorial 
sovereignty. A move that is shared by China due 
to the 'massive' presence of Chinese military and 
Introduction 
During ASEAN meeting in Phnom Phen 
last year for the first time in 45 years of ASEAN 
history the lowest denominator mechanism has 
failed to produce a closing communique with 
regard to the Code of Conduct (COC) in South 
China Sea. Political bargaining between 
Cambodia as a chair and China as the biggest 
claimant was presumed as the driving factor 
behind Cambodia uneasiness to advance for 
further talks. Philippines sent clear signal of its 
disappointments to fellow member states for 
failing to agree on concerted actions vis a vis 
China. Fragmentation within ASEAN was so 
apparent and it posed as a threat to ASEAN 
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This paper is a continuation of previous paper that was written under the similar heading and has been presented in 
an national workshop on Southeast Asian Study. Refering to recent ASEAN's stance on South China Case 
especially under Cambodia presidency, the writer thinks it is necessary to test the hypothesis by incorporating the  
It is argued that this body of water holds 
abundant amounts of oil and hydrocarbon 
reserves, thus it is considered as the potential 
“second Persian Gulf.” Furthermore, it is of 
great strategic importance as sea lines for 
commerce as well as for maritime security and 
thus, bores geopolitical implications for the 
security in Southeast Asia.  Consequently, this 
body of water serves as an incentive for states to 
secure access to oil resources and to exert control 
over this region. In return, the competition for 
more control has led to conflicting national 
interests between several regional powers. This 
dispute does not solely involve a state's desire to 
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Stuart Grudgings and Manuel Mogato, China 
Agrees S.China Sea Talks Amind New Row With 
Manila. 1st July 2013,  Jakarta Post 
This in return has triggered various skirmishes 
over the territorial dispute between China and 
Vietnam.  Disputes over the islands also 
contributed to China's war against Vietnam in 
1979. For details see table 1. 
Mingjiang Li, “Reconciling Assertiveness and 
Cooperation? China's Changing Approach to the 
South China Sea Dispute.” Security Challenges, 
Vol. 6, No. 2 (2010), pg 52.
The total reserve of oil and hydrocarbon in this 
body water was estimated up to 17.7 billion tons 
making it the world's fourth-largest reserve bed. 
Moreover the prospects of fishery on these waters 
are worth explored. Although it doesn't occupy the 
largest portion of the economic value, fishery 
offers an addition on the commercial strategic of 
the South China Sea. Over 11 million metrics tons 
of fish and invertebrates were harvested, this 
constitute to about ten percents of the world's total 
marine catch. 
Zou Keyuan, “Cooperative Development of Oil 
and Gas Resources in the South China Sea”, in: 
Security and International Politics in the South 
China Sea: Towards a Cooperative Management 
Regime, 2009, edited by Sam Bateman and Ralf 
Emmers. London: Routledge, pg 80.
The geopolitical implications of the South China 
Sea do not share only between China and the 
ASEAN member states, but also by external 
powers, especially the United States. It is United 
States' interest to maintain a neutral position in the 
territorial dispute and it even encourages the 
claimants to peacefully resolve these conflicting 
territorial claims. Considering a stable condition 
in the South China Sea is needed to ensure its sea 
line of trade and political alliance with some of the 
claimants. See, The United State Institute of 
Peace, The South China Sea Dispute prospect for 
Preventive Diplomacy, A Special Report of the 
United State Institute of Peace, (August 1997), pg 
2.
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para military at Second Thomas Shoal and the 
Scarborough Shoal.  Questions rise on the 
possibility of US's involvement in accordance to 
its rebalancing move towards Asia. However, 
On Kerry's visit in Brunei he has emphasized 
that it is not at 'US interest to contain or to 
counterbalance any country [China]', which 
might disappoint The Philippines who is eager 
for foreign support from its allies in time Beijing 
decided to unilaterally claimed its occupation on 
the South China Sea. At worst has ASEAN's 
style of dispute management proved as 
misleading?
The South China Sea is disputed by six 
claimants;  four of the clamaints are the member 
states of ASEAN -The Phillipines, Malaysia, 
Vietnam and Brunei Darussalam- in addition to 
China and Taiwan. The conflict was dated back 
to 1974 when China seized the Paracel islands 
from Vietnam and maintain its sovereignty over 
the territory since then. The disputed territory 
includes the Spartly and Paracel islands and 
extensive set of island clusters, atolls and reefs 
that are stretching along the Strait of Malacca in 
the Southwest and the Taiwan Strait in the 
Northeast. This area is often regarded as 'the 
throat' of the Pacific and Indian Oceans.
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Although the dispute harbors the 
potential for a flashpoint conflict in Southeast 
Asia region, presently an open war between 
claimants has not taken place yet. Various 
arguments have been put forward regarding to 
the influential factors behind the relatively 
stable South China Sea. A hard nationalist sees 
China's restraint from the South China Sea as a 
tactical move, because Beijing is still occupied 
with the Taiwan issues. 'Once the Taiwan front is 
closed, [China] may turn to South China Sea'. 
Meanwhile, integrational views argue that there 
are common norms or values that are upholded 
by the claimants; in this sense ASEAN and 
China, and in return have restrained and altered 
claimants' behavior towards an attainment of  
peaceful settlement of dispute management.
This paper uses the latter argument as 
the backbone of the research in its aim to analyze 
whether such norm is the determinant factors 
that drive clamaints' behavior in the region. The 
main research question for this paper is “To what 
extent does the norms of ASEAN's model of 
ensure that its economic and security needs are 
met, but it also implies competition on sensitive 
issues of sovereignty.
As one of the long-standing conflicts in 
the Southeast Asia region, territorial disputes 
over the South China Sea are potrayed as the 
most prominent challenge faced by China and 
ASEAN in the field of security. ASEAN and 
China are two strong advocates of sovereignty 
and they see the notion of sovereignty as delicate 
and sensitive issue, as it touches their very main 
of existence. Threat to territorial integrity can be 
seen as a threat to sovereignty because 
sovereignty constitutes and defines a state. 
Anything that can be portrayed as a violation of 
sovereignty can be presented as a security 
problem, regardless of the size of the threat. 
Thus, China's assertions of sovereignty over the 
South China Sea are provoking ASEAN's 
concerns regarding the Southeast Asia future 
security arrangement. 
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China sensitiveness over sovereignty is partly 
derived from what Chinese calls as the century of 
humiliation. During this period China has lost all 
the wars it fought and as a result China has to give a 
major concession. Some major wars are the 
Opium War  I and II with European and the British 
invansion to Tibet. Whilst ASEAN sensitiveness 
mainly driven by the colonialization and the Cold 
War era. 
For an example, Beijing sees Tibet and Taiwan 
cases as threats to its sovereignty. The 
independence of these two areas will undermine 
Beijing rights and legitimacy to manage and 
maintain its power. This in return may create a 
negative perceptions of China's credibilities, not 
only domestically but also internationally. Cited 
from Buzan, Barry Ole Wæver & Jaap de Wilde, 
Security: A New Framework for Analysis, (1998), 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, pg 142-145.
Large increase in China's military expenditure 
disturbs China's status quo in the region. There is 
incremental increase in China's defense spending; 
amounted 18,860 US$ m  in 1991 up to 129,272 
US$ m in 2011. Suspicion on higher Beijing's 
real defense spending is plausible. Cited from 
Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute (SIPRI).
An open scale war has not taken place yet, 
although various skirmishes have indeed 
occured since 1974. But it is argued that the 
tensions have not lead to open conflict. 
Diplomacy and peaceful settlement mechanism 
were opted as part of bilateral solution for 
conflict settlements.
Cited from Craig S. Smith, “China Reshaping 
Military to Toughen Its Muscle in the Region”, 
New York Times, 16 October 2002. See also S. P. 
Seth, “US Not Likely to Forfeit Role in Asia”, 8 
July 2011 http://publish.gio.gov.tw/FCJ/ 
past/02110862.html.tml
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Christian Reus-Smith, “Constructivism”, in 
Theories of International Relations, (1996), 
Palgrave Macmillan, pg 222.
Cited from Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is what 
States Make of it : The Social Construction of 
Power Politics”, International Organization, Vol. 
46, No. 2. (1992).
A positive perception refers to a situation where 
states in such group or community agree on 
conflict avoidances and to some extent seek for 
cooperation building.  
J. Boli, J. Meyer and G. Thomas, “Ontology and 
Rationalization in the Western Culture Account”, 
in Institutional Structure: Constituting State, 
Society, and the Individual, (1989), edited by G. 
Thomas et al, London, pg 12.
See Frederich V. Kratochwill, Rules, Norms and 
Decisison : On the Conditions of Practical and 
legal Reasoning in International Relations and 
Domestic Affairs, (1989), Cambridge : Cambridge 
University Press, pg 59 and Neta C. Crawford, 
Changing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention, 
Since prevailing perceptions towards 
each other decides the type of relations that 
emerges between states, a change in this 
perception will naturally lead to a change in the 
type of relationship. As 'anarchy is what states 
makes of it' thus, cooperative relations can be 
achieved if states on the initial stage have a 
'positive' perception towards the other. 
Subsequently, in order for a cooperative 
environment to take place, a positive shared 
perception between states must be achieved first.
Norms in this way can be a prominent 
tool that helps to establish certain perceptions. 
Norms can endorse cooperation once its shared, 
embedded and perceived as a guideline in 
conducting interaction between states. Once 
norms are institutionalized, it can 'define the 
meaning and identity of the individual actor and 
the patterns of appropriate economic, political, 
and cultural activity engaged by those actors'.  
The constructivist definition incorporates both 
 
regulatory and constitutive aspects. The 
regulatory function refers to norms as standards 
dispute settlement can influence China's 
behaviour with regard to the conflict of the South 
China Sea?”. The following subsections will 
address severals points. Constructivism will be 
used as a main theory as it highlights the 
importance of norms in international relations. 
An analysis on the Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation (TAC) as ASEAN's intramural 
norm of dispute settlement will be presented.  
Whether the ASEAN's norm of dispute 
settlement is able to duplicate itself into 
extramural terrain will be analyzed by looking at 
(in)consistency of China behaviours with regard 
to the dispute.
Constructivism
In order to see whether the norm of ASEAN's 
dispute settlement has the ability to influence the 
courses that take place in the South China Sea 
thus, Constructivism is argued as the best 
approach to do so. Constructivism focuses on the 
presence of ideas, and how ideas are able to 
influence-even alter state's behavior. Conflicting 
or cooperative relations between states thus, 
argued by Constructivism is influenced by the 
existing perceptions amongst states in such 
group. In other way, if states choose to perceive 
each others as friends, cooperative environments 
will emerge. Vice versa, if states perceive each 
other as threats, then conflicting relations will 
emerge between those states. Thus, how actors 
think about each other determines states 
behavior towards others. 
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As Wendt argues that '500 British 
Nuclear Weapons are less threatening to the 
United States than 5 North Korean Nuclear 
because the British are friends and the North 
Korean are not'. With regard to the South China 
Sea dispute, positive social interactions between 
states can lead to a benign relationship. If China 
is perceived as a friend by the ASEAN states and 
vice versa, claimants will be reluctant to impose 
hard policies to manage the tensions over the  
South China Sea. Conflict escalation can be 
restrained through investing in the (re)building 
positive image of each others that leads to 
amicable relationship.
The ASEAN Way
The norms and values that are at play in the 
South China Sea dispute are none other than the 
ASEAN norms. It is pricesely due to two 
reasons. Firstly, ASEAN is the only regionalism 
in the Southeast Asia region. With most of the 
claimants are its member states, any 
developments in the conflicted body of water 
will surely drag ASEAN. Secondly, China's 
'good-neighbour' policy has put ASEAN as 
Beijing's 'ally' towards the achievement of 
China's peaceful co-existence. This in return can 
explain China's eagerness to engage the 
ASEAN.
of behavior defined in terms of rights and 
obligations. Thus regulatory norms help actors 
to distinguish normal and abnormal behavior 
and to help coordinate expectation and decrease 
uncertainty, to influence decision making and to 
legitimate their action and the actions of others. 
Likewise, the constructivist definition of 
constitutive aspects of norms argues that norms 
not only establish expectations about how 
particular actors will behave but it also 
introduces states to a new interest and identity. 
Norms in this understanding constitute state 
identities and interest. The constitutive aspect of 
norm has the ability to transcend a state from a 
very Westphalian-sovereignty state to being a 
member of a group sharing common interests, 
values, a common identity (to some extent even 
giving up some of their sovereignty to 
supranational power, as the European Union 
does). Norms help to coordinate values among 
states and societies and help to ensure that the 
principle and practices of peaceful conduct and 
war avoidance are shared among the group.
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(1 April 1994), presented at International Studies 
Association Conference, Washington DC, page 4-
5.
Peter J. Katzenstein, “Introduction: Alternative 
Perspective on National Security”, in The Culture 
of National Security : Norms and Identity in World 
Politics, (1996), edited by Peter Katzenstein,  
New York : Columbia University Press, pg 5.
Amitav Acharya, “Constructing a Security 
Community in Southeast Asia : ASEAN and the 
nd
problem of Regional Order 2  edition”, (2009), 
London : Routledge, pg 24-26.
This leads to the understanding of Deutschian 
security community. Karl Deutsch argues that a 
security community can be defined as a group that 
has become integrated. This integration indicates 
an accomplishment of a sense of community and a 
presence of strong and widespread (in)formal 
institutions or practices, which ensure 'peaceful 
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167
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changes' among the members lasts over a long 
period of time. Cited from Karl W Deustch, 
“Security Communities”, in International Politics 
and Foreign Policy, edited by James N. 
Rosennau, (1961), New York : Free Press, pg 99.
Alexander Wendt, “Constructing International 
Politics”, International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1. 
(1995), pg 73.
Some arguments stated that one of the reasons 
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non-interference, the non-resort to the threat or 
use of force, quiet diplomacy, the non-
involvement of the Association in the resolution 
of bilateral disputes and mutual respect. 
Meanwhile the primacy of non-interference and 
quiet diplomacy has been linked to sovereign 
 
equality and consensual decision-making.   
Haacke mentions that there are at least three 
distinct conceptualizations of the ASEAN Way. 
First conceptualization conceives the ASEAN 
Way as a 'process of identity building which 
relies upon conventional modern principles of 
interstate relations as well as traditional and 
culture-specific modes of socialization and 
decision-making that are prevalent in Southeast 
Asia'. The second has centered on the ASEAN 
Way as a distinct decision-making procedure 
that is associated with processes of consensus 
finding, a consultation-consensus mechanism of 
musyawarah dan mufakat. The third focuses on 
The ASEAN's norms themselves are 
well embraced under the concept of the ASEAN 
Way. However, the understanding of the 
ASEAN way itself remains vague. Some 
scholars and politicians emphasize on the 
unique decision making process of musyawarah 
dan mufakat, while others depict the paramount 
principle of sovereignty and non-intervention. 
Some even argues that the ASEAN Way is built 
upon the practice of Asian culture, while other 
incorporated both the practices and the 
principles into one set of ASEAN's security and 
diplomatic culture. Haacke argues that  
imbedded in the ASEAN Way are the six core 
norms of the ASEAN Way: sovereign equality, 
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Some arguments stated that one of the reasons 
behind China's foreign policy shitf with regard to 
its ASEAN counterparts was an implication of 
Jiang Zemin's Peaceful Rise (later on changed to 
Peaceful Coexistence).  Peaceful development 
signifies a good neighbor policy in which China 
seeks to establish partnership not only with large 
states but also with smaller states and partnership, 
not only with Western, developed countries but 
also with the Asian region to support Beijing's 
economic development. It is suggested that the 
total trade between China and ASEAN has 
increased more than twenty times in just 7 years. 
From 36.52US$ billions in 2001 to202.55 US$ 
billions in 2007 (Cited from Direction of Trade 
Statistics, Ministry of Commerce of China). 
Furthemore, as China sees the post Cold War era as 
a period moving towards a multipolar world 
system, in which a few major powers can develop 
friendly ties with each other and in which non-
zero-sum games. It tries to engage ASEAN by 
participating in ASEAN Regional Forum to solve 
the territorial dispute over the South China Sea. 
Thus, China has adopt the ASEAN Way as the 
regulationg norm in its tension with the ASEAN's 
claimants.
The concept of Musyawarah dan mufakat 
emphasizes the achievement of consensus and 
'consultation on the basis of equality, tolerance and 
understanding with overtones of kinship and 
common interest Amitav Acharya. Constructing a 
Security Community in Southeast Asia : ASEAN 
nd
and the Problem of Regional Order (2  ed), 
(2009), London: Routledge, pg 83.
Jurgen Haacke, ASEAN's Diplomatic and 
Security Culture : Origins, Development and 
Prospect, (2005) London: Routledge, page 3.
The ASEAN Way he argues, is identical with the 
shared assumption of 'socio cultural norms' of a 
pattern of consultation and consensus building in 
relation to the role and conduct of diplomacy as 
well as about what security challenges and how 
best to address it. ASEAN member states share the 
norms of tolerance and respectful, which is 
derived from its common Asian culture Jürgen 
Haacke, “Enhanced Interaction” with Myanmar 
and the Project of a Security Community: Is 
ASEAN Refining or Breaking with its Diplomatic 
and Security Culture?”, Contempory Southeast 
Asia : A Journal of International and Strategic 
Affairs, Vol.27, No.2, (2005),  pg 213.
Haacke, ASEAN's Diplomatic and Security 
Culture, pg 58-59 and Thambipillai, P., “ASEAN 
negotiating styles: asset or hindrance?”, in 
ASEAN Negotiations: Two Insights, edited by P. 
Thambipillai and J. Saravanamuttu, (1985), 
Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 
pg 3–28.
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it as an intramural approach to dispute 
management and confidence building. 
In its  conceptualization as an 
intramural approaches to dispute management 
The ASEAN Way drew out the Treaty of Amity 
and Cooperation (TAC) as a legal cornerstone of 
its model of dispute management. Becuase, TAC 
embodies 'universal principles of peaceful 
coexistence and friendly cooperation among 
States in Southeast Asia'. It alo emphasizes the 
neccessity of 'settlement of differences or 
disputes by peaceful means and renunciation of 
the threat or use of force' when conflicts arise. 
The signing of the Treaty of  
Cooperation and Amity (TAC) on 24 February 
1976 implies that ASEAN leaders finally agreed 
to express their intention for a better cooperation 
into a stronger written agreement. TAC inherits 
the basic concept of what is now called as the 
ASEAN Way along with the spirit of the Ten 
Principles adopted by the Asian-African 
Conference in Bandung on 25 April 1955.  These 
guidelines are projected into a set of unique 
characteristics of ASEAN regionalism that is 
known as the ASEAN Way, determines 
ASEAN's response to disputes and conflicts 
within the region. 
TAC depicts the principles of non-
intervention, peaceful settlement, independence 
and sovereignty in their relations with one 
another, as stated in article 2: “in their relations 
with one another, the High Contracting Parties 
shall be guided by the following fundamental 
principles: a. Mutual respect for the 
independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial 
integrity and national identity of all nations;  b. 
The right of every State to lead its national 
existence free from external interference, 
subversion or coercion; c. Non-interference in 
the internal affairs of one another; d. Settlement 
of differences or disputes by peaceful means; e. 
Renunciation of the threat or use of force and; f. 
Effective cooperation among themselves'. 
In addition, TAC provides a regional 
diplomatic instrument and a code of conduct for 
175
179
180
179
180
176
177
178
175
176
177
178
See M. Caballero-Anthony, “Mechanisms of 
Dispute Settlement: The ASEAN Experience”, 
Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 20, No.1, 
(1998), pg 38-66.
ASEAN Secretariat, “Text of The Treaty of Amity 
and Cooperation and Related Information”, 
ASEAN Knowledge Kit, March 2008.
Cited from ASEAN Secretariat, “Treaty of Amity 
and Cooperation (TAC)”, 3 Nov 2010 
http://www.aseansec.org/1217.htm.
ASEAN was established with the signing of The 
 
Bangkok Declaration on 8 August 1967. It aims 
and purposes “to promote regional peace and 
stability through abiding respect for justice and the 
rule of law in the relationship among countries of 
the region and adherence to the principles of the 
United Nations Charter”. Over time, Brunei 
Darussalam joined the ASEAN on 8 January 1984, 
followed by Viet Nam on 28 July 1995. On 23 July 
1997, Lao PDR and Myanmar joined the 
association, and Cambodia on 30 April 1999, 
making up what is today the ten Member States of 
ASEAN. The Bangkok Declaration thus, becomes 
one of the cornerstones of ASEAN's regionalism. 
See official wensite for ASEAN Secretariat. 
The Bandung Asia-Africa Conference was the 
result of non-alignment (non-bloc) movement that 
were conducted by Asia and Africa country in their 
aim to balance the big-power influences to weaker 
states in Asia and Africa. Especially during the 
backdrop of the Cold War between the United 
State and the USSR. Imbedded in it is the concept 
of non-use of force. The non-bloc movement was 
initiated by Indonesia (Sukarno) along with Ghana 
(Kwame Nkrumah), Egypt (Gamal Abdul Nasser), 
India (Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru) and Yugoslavio 
(Joseph Broz Tito). 
Cited from ASEAN Secretariat, “Treaty of Amity 
and Cooperation (TAC)”, 3 Nov 2010 
http://www.aseansec.org/1217.htm.
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the peaceful settlement of disputes. The 
settlement of disputes between members is 
outlined on Chapter IV: Pacific Settlement of 
Disputes Article 13 states that 'in case disputes 
on matters directly affecting them should arise, 
especially disputes likely to disturb regional 
peace and harmony, they shall refrain from the 
threat or use of force and shall at all times settle 
such disputes among themselves through 
friendly negotiations'. If no solution is reached 
through direct negotiations, as stated in the 
Article 15, 'the High Council shall take 
cognizance of the dispute or the situation and 
shall recommend to the parties in dispute 
appropriate means of settlement such as good 
offices, mediation, inquiry or conciliation'. 
Originally, TAC was conceived as an 
intramural ASEAN mechanism of 'legally 
binding code of friendly inter-State conduct'. It 
depicts the use of peaceful mechanism to 
manage conflicts. In 1987, the treaty was 
amanded to allow accesion by states outside the 
Southeast Asia thus, shifting the intramural 
ASEAN's model of dispute settlement into 
extramural context. Papua New Guinea - an 
observer in ASEAN- signed TAC in 5th of July 
1986, followed by China as the first foreign 
countries to show its commitment and adherence 
to ASEAN norms by signing the TAC on 8th Oct 
th 
2003. TAC then signed by India on the 8 of 
nd
October 2003, Japan and Pakistan on 2  July 
th
2004, Republic of Korea on 27  November 2004 
and lastly the Russian Federation on 29th 
November 2004.
TAC doesn't hold any binding or legal 
consequences -which is typical of ASEAN's 
style of loose multilateralism. Yet, it was a great 
achievement because the signing of TAC implies 
that each member state agrees and explicitly 
shows their agreeance with an ASEAN's model 
of dispute settlement; which relies on the notion 
that any dispute should be regulated in a manner 
that avoids negative attitudes that might hinder 
mutual cooperation. The ASEAN's norm to some 
extent has forced the signatory states to comply 
and behave accordingly to their commitments, 
because by submitting to TAC, states agree to 
bind itself to ASEAN's norm of the use of non 
force in dispute or conflict settlement. To 
highlight, the signing of TAC by the claimants 
implies the primacy of peaceful dispute 
settlement in managing conflicts over the South 
China Sea. 
China pragmatic - rhetoric actions in South 
China Sea dispute settlement processes 
To what extent does the norm of TAC 
–peaceful settlements- can influence China's 
behavior with regards to the South China Sea 
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Cited from ASEAN Secretariat, “Political 
A c h i e v e m e n t ” ,  3  N o v e m b e r  2 0 1 0   
http://www.asean.org/11833.htm.
Cited from ASEAN Secretariat, “Treaty of Amity 
and Cooperation (TAC)”.
Ibid,. ASEAN Secretariat, “Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation (TAC)”. However it is argued that the 
High Council is not an effective body, due to the 
inability of this body to solve major issues within 
ASEAN, such us the recent border dispute 
between Cambodia and Thailand. Additionally, in 
order to solve disputes, the conflicting party often 
prefers bilateral negotiations or mediation from 
third parties.  
ASEAN Secretariat, “Text of The Treaty of Amity 
and Cooperation and Related Information”, 
ASEAN Knowledge Kit, March 2008.
Ibid,. ASEAN Secretariat, “Text of The Treaty of 
Amity and Cooperation and Related Information”.
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will be analyses based on the (in)consistency of 
China stands towards the settlement dispute 
process; whether diplomatic solutions are 
Beijing's top priority in managing the dispute or 
Beijing is willing to breach its commitment by 
unilatarally using forces in settling the dispute. 
The dispute over the South China Sea is seen 
as an obstacle for a multilateral security structure 
in this region. Although ASEAN welcomes 
Beijing's intention to solve the problem of the 
South China Sea dispute peacefully, this does not 
mean that the cooperative arrangements are free 
from problems. During his visit to Singapore in 
1990, Chinese premier Lie Ping visit, he re-
emphasized China's periphery policy by 
highlighting Beijing willingness to shelve the 
sovereignty issues and encourage cooperative 
joint development with Southeast Asian 
countries in the South China Sea. Yet, in March 
1992 Beijing passed the China Territorial Sea 
Law which formally announced China claims 
over all the Spartly Island. This maritime law 
allows Beijing to exercise its sovereignty over its 
territorial sea and to emphasis its rights by 
exercising control over its contiguous zone in 
order to safeguard Beijing's maritime rights and 
 
interests.  
China rejects th UN Conviction on The Law 
of the Sea 1982 (UNCLOS) as basis for 
resolving the South China Sea dispute when 
President Ziang emphasized Chinese's claim to 
the 'indisputable sovereignty over the island and 
their adjacent waters'. In addition, in 1998 when 
the Philippines president visited Beijing, China 
advanced its commitment to pursue a peaceful 
soulution by pledging not to attack Filipino 
troops that were stationed in the Spartly islands. 
Nevertheless, China continued its building 
activities on the island that were being claimed 
by the Philippines. Later on, in 1999 Chinese 
warships were accused of harassing a Philippine 
navy vessel near the Spratly Islands.
A positive development was finally reached 
th
on the 4  of November 2002 when China agreed 
to sign the Declaration on the Conduct of 
Parties(DOC)  in the South China Sea. The DOC 
186
188
189
190
187
188
189
190
The cooperative agreement between China and 
ASEAN aside from managing territorial 
sovereignty and dispute will also cover the area of 
marine environmental protection and scientific 
research, safety of navigation and communication 
at sea as well search and rescue operation. It also 
indicates the necessity on combating transnational 
crime, including trafficking in illicit drugs, piracy 
and armed robbery and illegal traffic in arms, in 
the South China Sea.
Eric Hyer, “The South China Sea Dispute: 
Implications of China's Earlier Territorial 
Settlements”, Pacific Affairs, Vol. 68, No.1, 
(1995), pg 48.
186
187
Article 10 stated “The relevant responsible organs 
of the People's Republic of China shall have the 
right to order an immediate eviction of foreign 
military ships or ships owned by foreign 
Governments and operated for non-commercial 
purposes that violate the laws or regulations of the 
People's Republic of China while passing through 
the territorial sea of the People's Republic of 
China” and article 13 stated “The People's 
Republic of China has the authority to exercise 
powers within its contiguous zone for the purpose 
of preventing or punishing infringement of its 
security, customs, fiscal sanitary laws and 
regulations or entry-exit control within its land 
territories, internal waters or territorial sea” see 
h t t p : / / l i b w e b . u o r e g o n . e d u / e c / e -
asia/read/sealaw.pdf.
Amitav Archarya, “The ARF Could Well 
Unravel”,  in   The Evoving Pacific Power 
Balance, 1996, edited by Derak da Cunha, 
Institute of Southeast ASEAN Studies: Singapore, 
pg 63-69.
Hans Indorf, “The Spartlys : A Test Case for the 
Phillipine Base”, Center for Research and 
Communication, (1998), Manila 1998, pg 14.
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is a first step towards the establishment of a 
Code of Conduct (COC) in the South China Sea. 
It calls all parties to apply the principles of the 
Treaty of Amity and Co-operation in Southeast 
Asia as the basis of their relations in the South 
China Sea. The signing of DOC implied the 
adoption of TAC in which claimants agree to the 
non use of force in managing conflicts that arise 
 
between them.  It was seen as a great leap toward 
better future arrangements because ASEAN has 
successfully set up the first step for the dispute 
settlement in the South China Sea and has 
influenced China to submit to such multilateral 
solutions. An endorsement came in 2002 when  
the Philippines Foreign Minister Blas Ople 
stated that the signing lay a 'string foundation for 
future negotiation with China and our other 
ASEAN partners on maritime security and 
territorial issues'. Meanwhile China Vice 
Foreign Minister Wang Yi, responded by 
arguing the signing will 'send a positive signal to 
the outside world that China and ASEAN have 
full capability to resolve disputes among 
themselves, peacefully through dialogue. Since 
the signing of the DOC in 2002 the tension over 
the South China Sea lessened and temporary 
peace was present over the disputed sea. 
China's eagerness to acknowledge the 
norms that are embedded in the ASEAN were 
extended when in 2003 Beijing signed the 
Treaty of Amity of Cooperation (TAC). The 
signing itself makes China as the first among the 
major countries that adhere to the principles and 
practices of the ASEAN Way. Non-legally 
binding as they may be, the signing of the TAC 
indicates China's goodwill to create a stable and 
peaceful region, by prioritizing peaceful 
settlements. 
However, tensions were rising again 
during 2011 and early of 2012. In May 2011, a 
Vietnamese survey ship operating on its claimed 
continental shelf had its seismic cables cut by a 
Chinese patrol boat. In the same year, the 
Philippines placed diplomatic protest after 
China's territorial intrusion in Spartly island and 
urged China to avoid unilateral action that could 
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Pessimist arguments stated that the signing of 
DOC by China was a pragmatic move in order to 
put foward the economic ties between China-
ASEAN, indicated by the fact that on the same day 
China has signed the Framework Agreement on 
China-ASEAN Comprehensive Economic 
Cooperation that will open the road for a free trade 
area. China Ministry of Commerce, “China-
A S E A N  F T A ” ,  h t t p : / / f t a .  
mofcom.gov.cn/topic/chinaasean.shtml.
Christopher Chung, “Southeast Asia and the South 
China Sea Dispute”, in Security and International 
Politics in the South China Sea : Towards a 
Cooperative Management Regime, edited by 
Bateman and Emmers,  (2009), Abingdon: 
Routledge, pg 95.
See Ople Lauds, Signing of Declaration on the 
Conduct of parties in the South China Sea, 
Department of Foreign Affairs, The Philippines. 
www.dfa.gov.ph/news/pr/pr2002/nov/pr246html.
Christopher Chung, “Southeast Asia and the 
South China Sea Dispute”, pg 95. 
China tries to avoid hard line policies in the 
dispute of South China Sea, because it undermines 
Beijing's efforts to forge good relations and 
peaceful co-existence with its ASEAN neighbors. 
The Chinese government sees stability as a 
prerequisite of economic development. China's 
development would be impossible without Asia. 
On the other hand, Asia's prosperity is also 
impossible without China. See Judith F. Kornberg 
and John R. Faust (2005), China in World Politics: 
Policies, Processes, Prospects,  Lynne Riener, pg 
159.
Mark Valencia, “Did US Push China Over the 
Edge?”, http://the-diplomat.com/2011/06/24/did-
us-push-china-over-the-edge/, June 24 2011.
Ratih Indraswari, Projecting the Intramural ASEAN Norms into Extramural Terrain - Constructivism: 
Does TAC Work in the South China Sea?
126
harm the effort of peaceful dispute settlement 
over the territory. Shortly after the incidents took 
place, China sent two Vice Chairmen of the 
Central Military Commission to Southeast Asia 
to reassure other ASEAN claimants on Beijing's 
commitment to uphold the norms of peaceful 
settlement.  
On his visit to Singapore in June 2011, 
the Chinese Defense Minister General Liang 
Guanglie re-emphasized China's commitment 
'to maintain peace and stability in the South 
China Sea' and that 'China stood by' the DOC. 
Later on, China and the Philippines pledged 
'responsible behavior' in the disputed areas; 
repeated their commitment to a peaceful 
resolution of conflicting territorial claims, and 
agreed to avoid  'unilateral actions' that could 
further worsen the tensions over Spratlys 
Islands. Yet, this seems not sufficient enough as 
China's  encroachment persists occupying not 
only the Scarborough Shoal which is located just 
around 230 km from Phillipines territory, but 
expanding in to the Second Thomas Shoal. The 
blunt move had raised strong objection from 
Phillipines Foreign Minister Albert del Rosario 
calling it as an 'illegal occupation' and has 
thwarted the positive efforts toward establishing 
peaceful conducts in South China Sea. 
However, recently Beijing decided to 
soften its stance toward the territorial conflict by 
agreeing to hold an 'official consultations' on 
COC in South China Sea during a meeting with 
ASEAN senior officials in China this coming 
September. Chinesse Foreign Minster Wang Yi 
expressed his agreeance on the neccessity of 
maritime cooperation in South China Sea. 
Various comments can be extracted with China's 
sudden agreeance. Thailand Foreign Minister 
applaud it as a 'very significant' movement 
meanwhile, the Phillipines Foreign Minister 
expresses his hope that 'China is in earnest in 
terms of moving forward'. In contrast, a  rather 
bleak perspective is widely shared. Ian Storey, 
for example a senior fellow at the ISEAS 
arguing that although China's offer is an 
'encouraging sign' it was not 'a very significant 
step' considering the history of Beijing 
reluctantness to actually strive for a binding 
regulations. It merely is a rhetoric movement of 
China to buying more time. Despite whether 
China intetions are true, it is evident that China 
prefers to promote diplomatic solutions over 
brute force in solving dispute with ASEAN's 
claimants over the South China Sea. 
On recent speech refuted by Prime 
Minister of Republic of China Li Keqiang at the 
opening of the 10th China-ASEAN Expo and 
the China-ASEAN Business and Investment 
Summit in Nanning China, he re-emphasized 
China's upholding of the good-neighbour policy 
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Mark Valencia, “Did US Push China Over the 
Edge?”, http://the-diplomat.com/2011/06/24/did-
us-push-china-over-the-edge/, June 24 2011.
See Ben Bland and Kathrin Hille, “New Clash in 
South China Sea”, Financial Times,  May 27 
2011.
Cited from ABS News, “China Intrusion in 
Spratlys  Sparks  Diplomatic  Protest”,  July       
2 5  2 0 1 1  h t t p : / / w w w . a b s -
cbnnews.com/nation/05/24/11/china-intrusion-
spratlys-sparks-diplomatic-protest.
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Stuart Grudgings and Manuel Mogato, China 
Agrees S.China Sea Talks Amind New Row With 
Manila. 1st July 2013,  Jakarta Post
 Lesley Wroughthon and Stuart Grudgings, “Kerry 
Presses China, Southeast Asia to Ease Sea 
Tensions” 2nd July 2013.
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toward ASEAN and sees this regional 
organization as a 'long term strategic option 
instead of a matter of expediency'. However, this 
rhetorical good willing seems half hearted since 
the Chinese government did not extend their 
invitation to Philippines President Benigno 
Aquino III as a result of heighted tension over 
the South China Sea.
Skirmishes between claimants are 
indeed prevail in the South China Sea since the 
year of 1974 until 2012 (table 1). During this 3-
decade history of conflicts, China is the most 
involved claimant: waged and provoked 
tensions over the U shaped territory of the South 
China Sea. With the Phillipines and Vietnam are 
high on the list, a cease fire lasted only after 
China agreed to sign the  DOC in 2002. But this 
temporary peace ended when China  and the 
Phillipines involved in a new skirmish last year.
202
203
Tabel 1. Clashes in The South China Sea
Since 1974
 1974  China - 
Vietnam
Year Conflict
China seized the Paracels 
from Vietnam, with 18 of 
its troops killed in the 
clashes. Since then China 
continues to maintain its 
sovereignty over the 
islands. This in return has 
t r i g g e r e d  v a r i o u s  
skirmishes over  the 
territorial dispute between 
China and Vietnam.  
Disputes over the islands 
Conflicting 
Countries
 1988
 1992
 1995
 1994
 China - 
Vietnam
 China - 
Vietnam
 China - 
Philppines
 China - 
Vietnam
Abridged version of speech by Li Keqiang, Jakarta 
Post 6 September 2013. 
Hrvoje Hranjski, Manila Says China Withdraws 
Invitation For Aquino, Manila, Philippines August 
29, 2013.
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204
204
202
a l so  con t r ibu ted  to  
China 's  war against  
Vietnam in 1979 
Chinese and Vietnamese 
navies clashed at Johnson 
Reef in the Spratlys. 
Three Vietnamese boats 
were sunk and over 74 
sailors were killed. 
Vietnam accused China of 
landing troops on Da Luc 
Reef. China seized almost 
20
Vietnamese cargo ships 
that were transporting 
goods from Hong Kong to 
Vietnam.
C h i n a  o c c u p i e d  
P h i l i p p i n e - c l a i m e d  
Mischief Reef. Philippine 
mili tary evicted the 
Chinese in March and 
d e s t r o y e d  C h i n e s e  
markers. 
The  Mischeef  Reef  
China and Vietnam had 
naval confrontations 
w i t h i n  V i e t n a m ' s  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y  
recognized territorial 
waters over Vietnam's Tu 
Chinh oil exploration 
blocks 133, 134, and 
135.Chinese claim the 
area as part of their Wan' 
Bei-21 (WAB-21) block
Cited from Samuel S. G. Wu and Bruce Bueno de 
Mesquita, “Assessing the Dispute in the South 
China Sea: A Model of China's Security Decision 
Making”, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 
38, No. 3 (1994), pg 381 and see K. C. Chen, 
“China's War with Vietnam, 1979: Issues, 
Decisions, and Implications”, (1987), Stanford, 
CA: Hoover Institution Press.
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incident between China 
and Phillipine was one of 
the major conflicts which 
involved military forces. 
Phill ipine's National 
Security Adviser Roilo 
Golez  c la imed  tha t  
China's decision to exert 
its force in the Mischief 
Reef was due to the 
Philippines agreement 
w i t h  U . S .  e n e r g y  
company Vaalco on 8 May 
1994 which gave it a six 
month permit to collect 
information about the 
area. This agreement with 
an American company 
strengthened Phillipines 
claims on the area which 
was also disputed by 
China.
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206
 1996
 1999
 1999
 2000
 2001
 2001
 2011
 2002-
2010
 1997
 China - 
Philippines
 China - 
Philippines
 China - 
Philippines
 China - 
Philippines
 China - 
Philippines
 China - 
Philippines
 China - 
Philippines
 n/a
 China - 
Philippines
In January,  Chinese 
vessels engaged in a 90-
minute gun battle with a 
Philippine navy gunboat 
near the island of Capone, 
off the west coast of 
In May, a Chinese fishing 
boat was sunk in a 
collision with Philippine 
warship.
In May, Chinese warships 
were accused of harassing 
a Philippine navy vessel 
after it ran aground near 
the Spratlys.
In May, Philippine troops 
opened fire on Chinese 
fishermen, killing one and 
arresting 7.
During first three months, 
the Filipino navy boarded 
14 Chinese flagged boats, 
confiscated their catches, 
and ejected vessels out of 
contested portions of the 
Spratlys.
In March, the Philippines 
s e n t  a  g u n b o a t  t o  
Scarborough Shoal to 
ward off any attempt by 
China to erect structures 
on the rock
Department of National 
Defense and the Armed 
China has agreed to 
signed the Declaration Of 
Conduct 1992 in 2002. 
Since then temporary 
peace was retain over the 
South China Sea, until the 
incidents took places in 
2011 between China and 
Philippines as well China 
and Vietnam
The Philippine navy 
o r d e r e d  a  C h i n e s e  
speedboat and two fishing 
boats to leave
Scarborough Shoal in 
April; the Philippine navy 
later removed Chinese 
markers and raised its 
flag. China sent three 
warships to survey the 
P h i l i p p i n e - o c c u p i e d  
islands of Panata and 
Kota. The Philippines 
c o n s i d e r s  C h i n a ' s  
occupation in 1995 an 
1997 as direct assaults on 
Buszynski, “ASEAN, the Declaration on 
Conduct, and the South China Sea”, pg 348.
Liselotte Odgaard, “The South China Sea: 
ASEAN's Security Concerns About China,” 
Security Dialogue, Vol. 34, No. 1, (2004), pg 16.
the Philippines' territory
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Forces of the Philippines 
reports that a China 
Marine Survei l lance 
vessel and other People's 
Liberation Army Navy 
ships were seen unloaded 
building materials there in 
Reef-Amy Douglas Bank,  
a territory that belongs to 
the Philippines ZEE.   The 
Philippines and China 
pledged not to resort to 
"unilateral actions" that 
could further worsen the 
tensions over Spratlys 
island chain. 
207
 2011
 Early
2012
 China - 
Vietnam
 China - 
Philippines
Three Chinese patrol 
boats damaged an oil 
exploration ship operated 
by Petro Vietnam (the 
state owned oil and gas 
company). Vietnam has 
a c c u s e d  C h i n a  f o r  
escalating the long-
running dispute over 
control of the South China 
Sea and breaching the 
1982 UN convention on 
the law of the sea. China 
action has undermined the 
agreement to reduce 
tension over the South 
China Sea.
Philippines and China are 
at odd once again over  a 
t e r r i t o r y  ;  c a l l e d  
Scarborough Shoal by the 
P h i l i p p i n e s  a n d  
Huangyan Island by 
China.  This territory 
located up to 100 miles 
from the Philippines and 
Cited from ABS News, “China Denies 'Invasion' of 
South China Sea”, July 25 2011 http://www.abs-
cbnnews.com/nation/06/02/11/china-denies-
invasion-south-china-sea.
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500 miles from China
 2013  China - 
Philippines
I n c r e a s i n g  
m i l i t e r a l i z a t i o n  o f  
Chinesse presence in 
Scarborough Shoal and 
Thomas Second Soal has 
raised strong opposition 
from the Phillipines. 
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209
Source : US Energy of Information 
This recent clash drew quite heavy opinions from 
both side. The Phillipines supported Aquino's 
confronting arguments toward China, meanwhile 
in China people started to seriously advocating 
war. See BBC, 'China Bangs the War Drum over 
the South China Sea”, 10 May 2012, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-
18016901.
Mainly cited from the US Energy Information 
http://205.254.135.7/EMEU/cabs/South_China_
Sea/pdf.pdf.
See footnotes 23 for detail information on 
ASEAN – CHINA economic relationship.
Aside from skirmishes that illustrated 
CHINA-ASEAN's claimants relationship over 
the conflicting area of the South China Sea, an 
open warfare nor a 'full-scale' conflict did not 
take place. It can be argued that China's 
complience to promote peacfeul settlements is 
also derived from strategic consideration, 
especially economy. Nevertheless, claimants 
prefer peaceful dispute settlements in order to 
maintain and manage the tension. Thus, it did 
not undermine the 'enforceability' of the norm of 
TAC in influencing claimants' behaviour, 
especially China, in the South China Sea.
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Conclusion
As norms and values constitute states's 
interest and identity. It can be argued that to 
some extent the norm of TAC actually works in 
influencing Beijing's stands on the settlement 
process of the overlapping claims in the South 
China Sea.  It is indicated by China compliences 
to sign the DOC in the South China Sea in 2002, 
followed by the signing of  TAC a year after. 
Additionally, China's eargerness to promote 
peaceful dispute settlements were exemplified 
by Beijing's top goverment statements and its 
recent subtle agreence to pursue a Code of 
Conduct of behavior over the South China Sea. 
The China - ASEAN's claimants 
relationship were painted by skirmishes, 
tensions, diplomatic tensions and hard rhetoric 
stances. Nonetheless, there was no open war 
taking place between claimants remembering 
how important this body of water is. This has 
underlined claimants commitments to the norm 
of TAC in resorting to peaceful dispute 
settlements with regard to the South China Sea 
case. 
In the other side of arguments, China 
commitment to  uphold TAC's norm of peaceful 
settlement is questioned due to the inconsistency 
of Beijing behaviors with regard to the territorial 
dispute. In most of the cases China opts for 
diplomatic solutions, but it does not mean that 
China will restrain itself to what Beijing 
considers as violations to its sovereignty. Force 
is still an option, although it is not a key option.  
Based on the arguments above, it also can be 
argued that the norms of TAC solely can not 
fully restrain nor alter Beijing's behavior in the 
South China Sea.
However, arguing that TAC is 
completely useless in restraining claimants's 
behaviour is an impartial argument. Although 
the present of norm solely can not help scholars 
to understand the complex nature of the dispute, 
at some extent the norm of TAC does influence 
claimants perception towards the dispute. By 
perceiving that the norm of TAC –peaceful 
settlement is the prominent norm that regulate 
the international relations in the region,  states 
then must submit to its commitment in order to  
maintain the prevailing stability. Thus, norm 
itself is surely one of the concecutive part of the 
whole picture and is needed to understand the 
complexity of the South China Sea dispute.
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